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Abstract
This paper presents some new results on the price discovery process in both the Canadian and
U.S. 10-year Government bond markets using high-frequency data not previously analyzed.
Using techniques introduced by Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo-Granger (1995), we look at the
relative information content of cash and futures prices in the market for Canadian Government
bonds using futures market data from the Montreal Exchange and OTC cash market data
reﬂecting the inter-dealer market covered by CanPx. We also analyze similar data from the US
market over a somewhat longer period using data on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) futures
market as well as the cash market from GovPx in the ﬁrst part of the sample and subsequently
from BrokerTec.
In general, we ﬁnd that relatively more price discovery occurs in the futures markets than the cash
markets in both Canada and the U.S. and that the results look remarkably similar across the two
countries despite the large differences in the sizes of their markets and in their characteristics,
particularly on the cash side. These overall results, however, hide the fact that information shares
for the U.S. futures markets declined throughout 2004-05 apparently as a result of improvements
in the spot market BrokerTec platform. Day-to-day variation in price discovery information shares
is related to bid-ask spreads, trading volumes, and realized volatility in the markets but there
remains much unexplained.
JEL classiﬁcation: G12, G13, G14
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; Market structure and pricing
Résumé
Mettant à proﬁt des données de haute fréquence qui n’avaient pas été analysées jusqu’alors,
l’étude présente de nouveaux résultats concernant le processus de découverte des prix sur les
marchés canadien et américain des obligations d’État à dix ans. Au moyen de techniques
élaborées par Hasbrouck (1995) et Gonzalo-Granger (1995), les auteurs examinent les contenus
informatifs respectifs des prix au comptant et à terme pratiqués sur le marché des obligations du
gouvernement canadien, à la lumière des données de la Bourse de Montréal sur les contrats à
terme et des données de CanPX sur les opérations de gré à gré au comptant conclues sur le marché
intercourtiers. Ils analysent également des informations similaires pour le marché américain, sur
une période un peu plus longue, en se fondant sur les données du Chicago Board of Trade
concernant les contrats à terme et sur les données relatives au marché au comptant provenant de
GovPX, pour la première partie de l’échantillon, et de BrokerTec pour le reste de celui-ci.iv
Dans l’ensemble, les auteurs constatent que le marché à terme contribue davantage à la
découverte des prix que le marché au comptant, tant au Canada qu’aux États-Unis, et que les deux
pays présentent des résultats remarquablement similaires malgré les tailles et les caractéristiques
sensiblement différentes de leurs marchés respectifs, en particulier dans le cas du marché au
comptant. Ces résultats masquent toutefois le fait que la contribution des marchés à terme
américains à la découverte des prix a diminué tout au long de 2004-2005, par suite apparemment
des améliorations apportées à la plateforme de négociation BrokerTec pour les opérations au
comptant. Les variations quotidiennes de la contribution de chacun des deux marchés sont liées
aux écarts acheteur-vendeur, aux volumes de transactions et à la volatilité réalisée sur les marchés,
mais elles demeurent inexpliquées dans une large mesure.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G12, G13, G14
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Structure de marché et ﬁxation des prix  3 
1.  Introduction 
 
This paper presents some new results on the price discovery process in both the Canadian and 
U.S. 10-year Government bond markets. We look at the relative information content of cash and 
futures prices in the market for Canadian Government bonds using futures  data  from the 
Montreal Exchange and OTC cash data reflecting activity in the inter-dealer market covered by 
CanPx, a consolidation of screen-based, inter-dealer voice brokers.  The paper also examines 
price discovery across futures and spot markets for the U.S. Open pit and electronic market 
trading data for the 10-year Treasury note come from the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) while 
spot market data comes from GovPx, a consolidator of inter-dealer voice brokers, and 
BrokerTec, the dominant electronic inter-dealer broker platform.  This paper has two  main 
contributions. The first is the within-country comparison of price discovery across futures and 
cash markets for Government debt which has received limited attention in the literature and none 
using the BrokerTec data which is the most up-to-date available. The second main contribution is 
the U.S.-Canadian comparison which is interesting given that Canadian markets are much 
smaller, with less trading and wider spreads, and that the inter-dealer brokered market is still 
largely voice-based. 
 
We follow the information-share approaches introduced by Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo-
Granger (1995) building on the ideas of Booth et al. (1999) to evaluate contributions of  trading 
in the cash and futures markets to the price discovery process. The two approaches work in a 
vector error correction model but offer alternative methodologies for separating long-run price 
movements from short-run market microstructure effects.  Both techniques are used to offer a 
robust analysis and because each has its advantages and disadvantages. As well, we determine 
size and temporal measures of market adjustment to equilibrium during the price discovery 
process in the spirit of those introduced by Yan and Zivot (2004).  
 
We find that, on average over the full sample, about 70% of price discovery occurs on the futures 
markets in both Canada and the U.S. Similarly, the futures markets have smaller cumulative 
deviations from new fundamental values following shocks and are also able to find these new 
values significantly quicker. It is also revealed, however, that over the last two years of the   4 
sample (2004-05) the contribution of the U.S. futures market to price discovery has been 
declining despite a number of changes that have been made to improve the quality of that 
market. Improvements in the electronic trading platform in the spot market seem to be drawing 
price discovery away from the futures market through increased volume and lower spreads. At 
the end of 2005, about 50-60% of price discovery was on the U.S. electronic spot market. The 
Canadian results were relatively more stable but there were also fewer changes and shocks to the 
trading systems.  The Canadian spot market has maintained a sizeable contribution to price 
discovery, about 30%, despite being compared to a growing electronic exchange-based market. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. We present a brief review of the antecedent literature on price 
discovery in section one. Section two surveys the econometric methodology employed in the 
paper while section three introduces the various markets considered in this study. Section four 
presents some descriptive statistics for the individual markets followed by section five which 
relates the main empirical results of the paper. Price discovery information share and impulse 
response measures are computed and compared across the markets. Section six discusses the 
determinants of the information shares and the final section offers some conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Related Literature 
 
Price discovery refers to the process through which financial markets converge to the efficient 
price of the underlying asset. Theoretically when two similar markets for the same product are 
faced with the same information arriving simultaneously, the two markets should react at the 
same time in a similar fashion. When the two markets do not react at the same time, one market 
will then lead the other. When such a lead-lag relation appears, the leading market is viewed as 
contributing a price discovery function for that sector. Price discovery has been and continues to 
be an active field of research. The following researchers have looked at this question using a 
number of different cash and futures markets; in particular, Garbade and Silber (1982) looked at 
commodity futures, Stoll and Whaley (1990), Chan (1992) examined U.S. stock index futures, 
Grunbichler, Longstaff, and Schwartz (1994) studied German stock index futures, Poskitt (1999) 
has studied New Zealand interest rate futures, Upper and Werner (2002) examined German Bund   5 
Markets, and Mizrach and Neely (2005) analyzed the U.S. Government bond markets. Finally, 
Campbell, Chung, and Hendry (2007) completed a preliminary analysis of the Canadian 10-year 
Government bond markets that serves as a starting point for this paper. A full description of the 
recent literature on the information share and price discovery literature can be found in 
Campbell, Chung, and Hendry (2007). This section will only relate some of the highlights from 
this work. 
 
Microstructure research typically finds that the futures market leads the cash market and 
contribute more to the price discovery process. The principle explanation for this is that futures 
markets generally have relatively lower transaction costs given that they are typically exchange 
based as opposed to over-the-counter markets. The trading cost hypothesis of price leadership 
that predicts that the market with the lowest overall trading cost will react most quickly to new 
information (see Fleming, Ostdiek, and Whaley, 1996).  
 
 
As we have suggested, a number of different methodologies have been used to determine the 
time difference in the lead-lag relationship. In this paper, we will focus on the information share 
methodologies of Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995). Hasbrouck (1995) is 
based on the assumption of an efficient price common to both the futures and cash market and 
characterizes a market’s contribution to price discovery  -  its information share  -  as the 
“proportion of the efficient price variation that can attributed to that market.” (p. 1177). 
Hasbrouck has argued that the appropriate econometric context for the analysis is supplied by the 
vector error correction model (Stock and Watson, 1988). Another approach is supplied by the 
identification of long-memory common factors suggested by Granger and Gonzalo (1995). The 
relative merits of the two approaches are the subject of some discussion; a special issue of the 
Journal of Financial Markets (2002) is devoted to the topic. While much of the previous 
literature has examined on equity markets, our focus is on fixed-income markets. 
 
Upper and Wener (2002) is very much in the spirit of our contribution. They examine price 
discovery between the German Bund futures and spot markets during 1998. They find that 
between 67% and 81% (using the Hasbrouck methodology) or about 83% (using the Gonzalo-  6 
Granger methodology) of price discovery occurred in the futures market during the relatively 
normal times of the first half of 1998. However, during some of the more volatile periods in the 
second half of 1998, particularly  around the time of the LTCM crisis, the  share of price 
discovery of the spot market fell to near zero. They claim this is consistent with anecdotal 
evidence they have that during stress periods spot trading simply follows the futures markets. 
 
A recent addition to the literature is Mizrach and Neely (2005) who use the Hasbrouck and 
Granger-Gonzalo information shares to investigate bivariate price discovery across different cash 
and futures markets for U.S. Government bonds of different maturities. An innovation in this 
paper is the study of price discovery in a system of futures and cash bond prices of different 
maturities. For 10-year bond data, the cash market dominated price discovery from 1995 to 1999 
with an information share above 50%. However, in 2000 the cash market information share 
dropped significantly and the futures market began to dominate price discovery.  In the full 
specification combining different maturities, it was found that trading in the 5 year bond cash 
market and the 30-year bond futures market dominated price discovery. 
 
A recent paper examining price discovery across markets by Yan and Zivot (2004) assesses the 
efficiency of price discovery by the magnitude of pricing errors given by impulse response 
functions of the reaction to a permanent shock to the efficient price. Their methodology is similar 
in spirit to Hasbrouck (2003) but takes it a step further to measure numerically deviations from 
the efficient price. They apply their methodology to the case of price discovery for the JPY/EUR 
exchange rate by comparing the prices in the direct trading market to the markets for indirect 
implied trading via USD/EUR and JPY/USD. They find that substantial price discovery occurs 
through the USD markets due to the much greater degree of liquidity available in these markets. 
The relative liquidity and lower transaction costs of the USD markets are conducive to the 
efficient assimilation of dispersed economy-wide information. 
 
One other recent paper is worth mentioning even though it does not use the information share 
methodology. Brandt et al (2006) investigates price discovery across four U.S. Treasury cash and 
futures markets, the 2-, 5-, 10-, and 30-year, for the period from 1995-2000 using GovPx and 
CBOT data. They find that net order flow has significant explanatory power for price dynamics   7 
in both cash and futures markets. In particular, net order flow in two and five-year spot markets 
and in the futures markets by exchange members and retail traders is important for both cash and 
futures market price discovery. Overall, they find important cross-market interactions in the price 
discovery process. The current paper does not focus on the contribution of order flow to price 
discovery but instead focuses on a much more up-to-date sample, uses a different methodology, 
and makes an international comparison. The role of order flow in the price discovery process will 
be the focus of future work. 
 
The current paper extends earlier work in Campbell, Chung, and Hendry (2007) which estimates 
information shares for only the 10-year Government bond futures and spot markets. That paper 
estimated information shares using basic OLS, as have previous papers, as well as a GARCH 
specification in an attempt to control for the obvious presence of heteroskedasticity. Futures 
market information shares were found to be about 70%, or slightly lower when using a GARCH 
model. The current paper estimates a more unrestricted version of the VECM from Campbell, 
Chung, and Hendry (2007) and makes the comparison to the U.S. results. 
 
 
3.  Price Discovery Across Markets  
 
Both the Hasbrouck and Gonzalo-Granger approaches to price discovery feature a decomposition 
of price movements into a permanent, non-stationary component and a transitory component. 
Although ultimately related, the t wo approaches differ on how the permanent component is 
identified. With the Hasbrouck approach, the permanent component is a martingale and 
accordingly reflects features of efficient market behaviour. By contrast, the non-stationary 
component in the Gonzalo-Granger approach may be forecastable. Our intent is not to comment 
on the relative merits of the two approaches. There appears to be some consensus in the literature 
that both are useful. Here we outline the essential components of the two approaches. For further 
details on these specifications, it should be noted that a recent issue of the Journal of Financial 
Markets (2002) describes and assesses the two approaches in some detail. 
   8 
Assume that a particular asset is traded in N different markets with I(1) prices represented by pit 
for I = 1,…,N. Suppose the prices are cointegrated and have an r
th order VAR representation in 
levels. Such a specification can be converted into a first difference or return VECM as follows: 
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where pt is a vector of the N prices, vt is an error vector with covariance matrix W, and a (NXR), 
b (NXR), and Bj (1XN) are parameters to be estimated (with R being the number of cointegrating 
vectors among the N prices). The error correction term b'pt has rank R=N-1 since all the prices in 
the N different markets are cointegrated and will move together over time. This vector of error 
correction terms is given as  
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Some previous studies have chosen to assume (1, -1) cointegrating vectors between prices in 
different markets, especially when the assets involved are equity based.
1 However, it can be 
argued that spot and futures bond prices are not directly comparable so a more general 
specification should be allowed.  In this paper, we adopt the more general specification in (2), as 
do Mizrach and Neely (2005), to account for effects coming from the conversion factors applied 
to the different bonds in the basket of deliverables for the futures contract and from intraday 
movements in the prices on repo transactions, which are often used to finance bond positions.  
 
The adjustment coefficients in a govern the speed at which prices respond to disequilibria in the 
prices between markets. As aj?0 the price in market j responds less to a disequilibrium between 
                                                   
1 Chung, Campbell, and Hendry (2007) assume a (1, -1) cointegrating relationship between raw spot and futures 
prices while Upper and Werner (2002) assume the same cointegrating vector between futures prices and spot prices 
adjusted for an estimated cost of carry.   9 
markets implying that market j tends to lead, not follow, and that it accounts for more of the 
price discovery for the underlying asset. 
 
The Hasbrouck (1995) approach follows Stock and Watson (1988) to decompose prices into their 
permanent and transitory components. After rewriting (1) in moving average form, 
t t v L C p ) ( = D , some algebra can generate an expression for the price level that has a permanent 
and transitory component: 
(3)      , ) ( ~ ) 1 ( 0 1 p v L C v C p t k
t
k t + + = ￿ =  
where C(L) and  ) (
~
L C  are matrix polynomials in the lag operator L. The first term is the 
permanent component while the second is the transitory. C(1), the sum of the moving average 
coefficients, has identical rows due to cointegration between the prices. Baille, Booth, Tse, and 
Zabotina (2002) show that 
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where p is a scalar factor and a^ and b^ are orthogonal complements of the parameters in (1). 
 
If c=[c1 … cN], then the permanent contribution of the innovation vector vt to the price is cvt  
with variance given by cWc', where W is the covariance matrix of vt. Since W is typically not 
diagonal, Hasbrouck proposes using a Choleski factorization of W to find the lower triangular 
matrix F such that FF’=W. The Hasbrouck information share for market j is then defined as: 
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which is the proportion of the variance of the permanent component of prices coming from 
market  j. The Hasbrouck information shares are the result of an infinite horizon variance 
decomposition of the prices in the N markets. Since the Choleski decomposition depends on the 
ordering of the variables in the covariance matrix, the Hasbrouck information share is not 
unique. Upper and lower bounds on the information share are calculated from all possible 
orderings of the variables.   10 
 
The second measure of information shares is based on Harris, McInish, Shoesmith, and Wood’s 
(1995) application of the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) common factor approach to the 
decomposition of prices into their permanent and transitory components. Under this approach, 
prices are determined as follows: 
 
(6)      t t t p f W p ~ + =   , 
 
with ft the non-stationary permanent component and  t p ~  the stationary transitory component. 
Identification is achieved by imposing two conditions. The first stipulates  that  ft is a linear 
combination of the current prices pt (i.e. that  t t p f G = ) while the second assumes that the 
transitory component does not Granger-cause the permanent component. If the factor weights are 
normalized so that they sum to one, then they can be interpreted as the contributions of the prices 
to the permanent component. Gonzalo and Granger (1995) showed that the vector of factor 
weights (G) is orthogonal to the vector of error correction term loadings (a) in (1). In other 
words,  G¢ = ^ a . This implies that the factor weights and GG information shares in a bivariate 
example are given by  














=   . 
 
In short, the differences between the two approaches relate to the martingale feature of the 
Hasbrouck approach contrasted with the Gonzalo-Granger approach, and the fact that along with 
the weights associated with the error-correction adjustment the Hasbrouck approach considers as 
well the variances of the underlying innovations. These points are emphasized in Baillie et al 
(2002).     
 
One final point to  note is that the Hasbrouck information share is bounded by [0,1] by 
construction. The GG measure, however, sums to one across the two markets but is not 
necessarily bounded by the [0,1] interval. As such, there are examples in our day-by-day   11 
estimation  for which the GG information share is outside the [0,1] interval and thus quite 
difficult to interpret. 
 
The Canadian case will compare price discovery across two markets, the electronic futures 
market for the CGB and the inter-dealer brokered market covered by CanPx. For the U.S., price 
discovery information shares will be investigated across three markets, the futures pit at the 
CBOT, electronic futures trading also at the CBOT, and electronic inter-dealer trading via 
BrokerTec. 
 
Another manner in which price discovery has been studied recently is to examine the shape of 
the impulse response functions in each market following a shock. Hasbrouck (2003) performed 
visual inspections of the response functions to get a flavour for the speed of convergence across 
markets. Yan and Zivot (2004) formalized this methodology by computing the cumulative 
pricing errors during the price discovery process. Some preliminary technical remarks are in 
order. 
 
According to this approach, we first compute the cumulative difference between the impulse 
response value in each period and the value to which it converges in the long-run. Since 
structural shocks are identified via Choleski decompositions, it follows that there are four 
impulse responses for each of two decompositions in the bivariate case (two variables 
responding to two shocks according to two decompositions). Within each decomposition, the 
cumulative sums are then weighted by the share of the asymptotic variance decomposition for 
that market and shock (i.e., the futures market response to a cash market shock is weighted by 
the contribution of the cash market to futures market volatility in the long run). In turn, each 
Choleski decomposition is equally weighted. The result is a cumulative pricing error. Higher 
values of the error imply slower convergence to the new long-run equilibrium value following a 
shock; in other words, there is slower price discovery in that market.  
 
In this paper we have used another statistic that is perhaps easier to interpret than the cumulative 
pricing error in the previous impulse-response analysis. We determine, for each shock, the 
number of periods it takes the cash and futures market to return to equilibrium, or more   12 
precisely, to within a close approximation (10%) of equilibrium. The estimates for each impulse 
response were weighted in the same manner as above to yield an average number of periods until 
convergence. Accordingly, we then have a simple time measure of the relative efficiency of the 
two markets in processing new information. 
 
All of the estimation in this paper was done using OLS. The VECM models estimated using 
Canadian data and the bivariate U.S. model with GovPx data assumed two lags based on the 
average across the daily results of different information criteria. The U.S. trivariate models with 
two futures markets and a spot market assumed six lags. 
 
 
4.  10-Year Spot and Futures Data in Canada and the U.S. 
 
Canadian Data 
The source for the spot market data for the Government of Canada 10-year bond is Moneyline 
Telerate’s CanPx system. A detailed analysis of liquidity in this market can be found in D’Souza, 
Gaa, and Yang (2003).  CanPx is a data service that consolidates and disseminates trade and 
quotation data submitted by Canada’s fixed-income  screen-based inter-dealer voice brokers.  
Over the sample period, the four Canadian inter-dealer brokers (IDB) are Freedom International 
Brokerage Company, Prebon Yamane (Canada) Ltd., Shorcan Brokers Limited, and Tullett 
Liberty (Canada) Ltd. CanPx was introduced by the IDBs and securities dealers on August 20, 
2001 with a view to enhancing the degree of transparency in the Government bond market. 
Although in operation since 2001, there are two large breaks in the sample, from September 
2001 to February 2002 and from March to September 2003; the data has not been archived. The 
sample used for this paper covers the period from February 26, 2002 to February 25, 2003 and 
November 27, 2003 to February 27, 2004. 
 
Quotes posted at an IDB are firm commitments to trade at the specified price. The volume, 
however, can be ‘worked up’ through negotiations between the buyer and seller once a trade is 
initiated. The CanPx data amalgamates all the trade and quote data presented on the screens of 
the four IDBs from approximately 0700 to 1800 each day. Only the best bid and offer quotes   13 
from across the four IDBs are presented to CanPx customers and stored. For information on how 
this data was cleaned, see Campbell, Chung, and Hendry (2007). 
 
Roughly 55% of the Canadian secondary spot market was customer-dealer trade in 2002, while 
46% was inter-dealer trading. Of the inter-dealer trading, 86% was through IDBs with the 
remainder being direct dealer to dealer trade. The CanPx data is relatively complete in that it 
records the best bid and offer quotes as well as all trades from all four of the Canadian IDBs.  
 
In September 1989, the Montreal Exchange introduced a futures contract on the  10-Year 
Government of Canada Bond to trade under the ticker symbol CGB.
2 At any given time there are 
up to eight contracts available for trading corresponding to four maturity dates per year over two 
years. The vast majority of trading volume takes place on the front-month contract. Trading in 
the next-to-deliver c ontract usually increases only after the first notice day for the currently 
traded contract. In this study we have rolled over contract maturities when volume on the next-
to-deliver contract surpasses the volume on the front-month contract. 
 
In September 2000, the Montreal Exchange moved from a traditional open outcry system to an 
automated electronic system. Intraday transactions for the CGB are available since October 22, 
2001. This study only considers data from the daily open continuous trading session that runs 
from 8:20 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. In this data set, a recorded quote represents the best bid/offer spread 
at the time of recording and is maintained until a subsequent quote is entered.  
 
Seven  complete  contracts fall within the purview of the  Canadian portion of this study.  In 
general, the trading days associated with a specific contract run until one to three days after the 
first notice of the contract. The cutoff is determined at the point where the volume for the next 
contract exceeds that of the current contract. Days with early closures before holidays, greater 
than two hours with no price update (typically signaling a technical problem with the recording 
of data), and with more than one minute of missing data at the beginning of the day are excluded. 
All told there are 385 trading days in the sample. 
 
                                                   
2 Further information on the CGB contract on the Montreal Exchange can be found in Campbell and Chung (2003).   14 
Since firm bid and ask quotes are available for both Canadian markets, the mid-point of the bid 
and ask prices is used as the fundamental variable to be modeled. There are considerably more 
frequent quote updates throughout the day than there are transactions so this focus on quotes 
allows for a data set with much richer and more realistic price dynamics. Only data on the 10-
year benchmark bond are used.
3  The data are sampled at 30-second intervals implying 800 
observations per day. 30 seconds was approximately the average duration between quote updates 
on the futures market. Finally, based on results from various information criteria, the VECM was 
estimated with two lags for each day in the sample. 
 
 
US Data   
There are two sources of spot market data for the U.S. Government 10-year bond. The first is 
GovPx, a consolidation service for the voice-brokered inter-dealer market. It was founded in 
1990 by the dealer and inter-dealer broker community in response to concerns among 
government authorities that there was insufficient price transparency in the U.S. Treasury 
market. Quote and trade information from three inter-dealer brokers  - Garban-Intercapital, 
Hilliard Farber, and Tullett & Tokyo Liberty – are combined into a single source that is marketed 
in real-time to fixed-income professionals. Only one major inter-dealer broker, Cantor 
Fitzgerald, is not a contributor, an omission that is only considered a problem in the 30-year 
Treasury bond market. The data used in this study runs from January 2000 to the end of May 
2001 in order to use the latest data possible, and because trading through GovPx brokers drops 
significantly beginning in 2001 quite possibly due to the advent of alternative electronic trading 
systems. Transaction price data is used to match the available futures data. The data is for the on-
the-run bond.  
 
Subsequent spot market data originates with  BrokerTec, an inter-dealer electronic trading 
platform of secondary wholesale U.S. treasury bonds that currently has a market share of 
approximately 60-65% of the active issues.  While BrokerTec does still offer voice-broker 
services, the data available is for its electronic platform and comprises the vast majority of its 
                                                   
3 The cheapest-to-deliver bond from the basket of bonds supporting the futures contract is often not the benchmark 
bond. Spot market quoting and trading on the off-the-run bonds, however, is too thin in Canada to give a 
consistently reliable measure of pricing.   15 
activity. Its success since it opened for business in June 2000, as well as that of other electronic 
competitors, is one of the main reasons for the decline in trading reported through GovPx. The 
BrokerTec platform increased its market share substantially during the sample under study by 
offering a fast and efficient trading system that was kept state-of-the-art.  
 
BrokerTec functions as a limit order book and operates from 7:00 pm until 5:30 pm EST the next 
day. Data on the full order book is available but only transactions prices will be used in this 
study to match data available from the futures market. The intraday data is available from April 
8, 2002 until December 31, 2005. Only data for the on-the-run issue from the open hours of the 
futures pit (8:20 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. EST) will be used.  
 
The U.S. 10-year treasury futures contract is primarily traded on the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT).  The CBOT only provides transaction price and volume  data. The data  used spans 
January 2000 to December 2005. Electronic trading on the CBOT began in August 2000 while 
pit trading began in 1977. Pit trading is open from 8:20 am to 3:00 pm EST, while electronic 
trading runs from 8:00 pm one day to 5:00 pm the next day EST. Data for both futures markets is 
used but only for the period from 8:20 – 3:00 when the pit is open. There are four contracts per 
year with maturities in March, June, September, and December; the same as in Canada. The data 
rolls from one contract to the next when daily trading on the 1
st back contract surpasses trading 
on the front contract.  
 
There were a number of changes to the CBOT trading environment during the sample period. In 
January 2004, the CBOT adopted the clearing system of the Chicago Merchantile Exchange 
(CME) which allowed its members, particularly those who are also CME members, to save some 
$1.8 billion in risk capital. At the same time, the CBOT adopted the electronic trading platform 
of LiffeConnect from Euronext which substantially improved trading speeds. One of the main 
reasons for these changes was the impending entry to the Treasury futures market of Eurex. On 
February 8, 2004, Eurex began trading Treasury futures in the U.S. in direct competition with the 
CBOT. In response, the CBOT improved its clearing system and trading platform as well as 
lowered its trading fees by over 75%. While trading on Eurex began reasonably well, about a 5% 
market share in its first week, it never became a significant competitor for the CBOT and its   16 
share fell to less than 2% after only a few weeks. Eurex ceased trading Treasury futures contracts 
in June of 2005. After Eurex exited the market, trading fees were raised once again in the latter 
half of 2005 in conjunction with an upgrade to its electronic trading platform. 2005 also saw the 
imposition of position limits for the last ten days of trading of its Treasury futures contracts. 
Traders were restricted to hold less than 50000 10-year futures contracts starting with the 
December 2005 contract. This action was taken after the amount of 10-year contracts settled 
through physical delivery reached record levels for the March and June 2005 contracts. The 
CBOT set these limits to improve contract performance and ensure the integrity of the market, 
but it was not a universally popular change among the larger players. All of these changes could 
have had a substantial effect on the price discovery process. The improvements in the trading 
framework at the CBOT would likely have increased price discovery on the futures market, 
while the increased competition from Eurex and increased fees could have driven price discovery 
away.  
 
As with the Canadian sample, only full days are considered. Days with early closures before a 
holiday or significant periods of missing data are excluded. Days with more than one minute of 
missing data at the start of the day (8:20) are also omitted to ensure sufficient data was available 
before the 8:30 typical macro news announcement time. For the GovPx sample, days with fewer 
than 30 trades are excluded. Similarly, the GovPx sample is terminated at May 29, 2001 due to 
long periods of inactivity in the subsequent period. This leaves seven contracts of data covered 
by GovPx and 15 contracts of data covered by the BrokerTec sample. As mentioned, transaction 
prices are used instead of quotes because quotes are not available for the futures market. The 
data is sampled at a 5-second interval when using the BrokerTec data but at a 30-second interval 
when using the GovPx data. Finally, based on information criteria test, the VECMs were 
estimate with two lags for the GovPx bivariate system and six lags for the trivariate systems.
4 
 
To sum up, the paper will compare price discovery in Canada for an electronic futures market 
and a screen-based inter-dealer voice brokered spot market to the U.S. for an open pit futures 
market, and electronic futures market, and an electronic inter-dealer brokered spot market. 
                                                   
4 A specification with longer lags was also estimated for the BrokerTec system but the results were qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar.   17 
 
 
4.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Before  presenting the  price discovery information shares,  Tables 2  and  3 provide a basic 
description of trading activity and bid/ask spreads across all of the markets. Further background 
information on the Canadian markets is contained in Campbell, Chung, and Hendry (2007) 
 
The CGB market saw the average daily number of trades increase from about 540 trades for the 
June 2002 Contract to just over 950 trades in the September 2004 contract period (see Table 2). 
This represented a daily total volume increase from about 5250 contracts to 7300 contracts. The 
average daily trade size, however, fell from about 9.8 contracts to about 7.8 contracts. With a 
notional value of $100,000 per contract this implies an average trade size of less that $1 million 
and a total daily notional volume of over $700 million. In contrast, in the inter-dealer spot market 
in June 2002 there were only about 30 to 40 trades each day representing just over $160 million 
in total daily volume. The average daily trade size fell from about $4.7 million during the June 
2002 Contract period to about $4.3 million during the September 2004 contract period. The inter-
dealer spot market trading through IDBs has many fewer trades per day but each trade is much 
larger. The futures market is four to five times the size of the spot market considered here in 
terms of the value of daily volume traded. 
 
The belief is that trading costs are generally lower on futures markets than on spot markets. The 
bid-ask spread, while an imperfect measure, gives a good indication of the level of transaction 
costs in the markets. Over the sample, the  percentage bid-ask  spread has fallen in the CGB 
market from about 4.84  basis points  for the June 2002 Contract to 2.67 basis points in the 
September 2004 Contract (see Table 3).
5 At the same time, the spot market spread fell from 7.20 
to 5.65 basis points. Both markets experienced reduced trading costs over the sample but, in each 
case, the CGB spreads were smaller by about 40% or more. This represents a potentially 
substantial savings for traders and a strong expectation for more price discovery in the futures 
market than in the spot market. 
                                                   
5 The percentage bid-ask spread is calculated as spread = [Pask-Pbid]/([Pask+Pbid]/2)   18 
 
The level of trading activity is much higher in the U.S. cash and futures markets. The mean daily 
number of trades on the inter-dealer BrokerTec platform increased from about 970 for the period 
of the June 2002 contract  to about 7827 for the December 2005 contract. During this same 
period, the number of trades on the CBOT electronic platform increased from about 12750 trades 
to a peak of almost 41000 trades during the December 2003 contract before falling back to about 
13580 trades for the December 2005 contract. There was a significant break in the average daily 
number of trades following changes in the CBOT trading platform and clearing system  on 
January 1, 2004. Futures trading in the CBOT pit reached its peak of 1550 trades per day during 
the September 2003 contract but fell to about 376 trades per day by the end of the sample. The 
number of futures trades each day fell after January 2004 but the number of contracts traded each 
day did not. As such, the average size of each trade increased substantially with the new futures 
trading platform from an average of about 12 to 38 contracts.
6 There were fewer small trades of 
every size up to 20 contracts after January 2004 implying that the clearing changes and savings 
in risk capital did not lead to the entry of new small investors (possibly retail) but rather caused 
the larger investors to begin to trade in bigger blocks. 
 
Liquidity, as indicated by (the inverse of) percentage bid-ask spreads, is higher in the U.S. than 
in Canada. Table 3 shows that, since the second half of 2003, the futures market spreads have 
been the lowest of all the markets at around 1.4 basis points.
7 Note that the typical price during 
this period and the convention to quote in 1/64 increments jointly imply that the typical futures 
market bid-ask spread is only one tic. During the earlier part of the sample, bid-ask spreads for 
tine inter-dealer spot market covered by GovPx increased from 2.7 basis points to just over five 
basis points for the June 2001 contract period. BrokerTec spreads have fallen from above four 
basis points to about 1.7 basis points over the sample. This substantial reduction in the 
BrokerTec spreads represents an important relative improvement in trading costs for the spot 
market that could have a significant impact on price discovery. 
 
                                                   
6 The median number of contracts per trade was five before January 2004 and ten afterwards. 
7 Note that, since there is only trade price data available for the U.S. futures market, only approximate or pseudo-
spreads can be calculated for this market. The bid-ask spread is approximated by the mean trade price change 
whenever there was a price change. This measure will approximate the bid-ask bounce or the spread.   19 
 
5.  Price Discovery: Empirical Results 
 
The  Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck information shares are  reported in  Table  4 for the 
Canadian futures market and in Tables 5 a-d for the U.S. futures markets. The cash market 
information share is, of course, just one minus the futures market share. The information share 
numbers reported are averages of the daily estimated shares. 
 
For the Canadian case, our main results use quote mid-points due to the greater frequency with 
which these prices are updated. Also reported, however, are  results using transaction prices 
because that is what is used in the U.S. analysis. Over the full sample, about 67.7% of price 
discovery occurred on the futures market according to the GG methodology. The information 
share increased from 58.5% for the June 2002 contract to about 71.3% for the March 2004 
contract. There was a marked increase in the information share of the futures market after the 
first contract but it was quite stable after that. A similar result is observed when following the 
Hasbrouck technique. Between 70.1% and 80.8%  (mid-point of 75.5%)  of price discovery 
occurred on the futures market.  The same pattern over the contracts is also observed. The 
volatility of the information shares is fairly high. For both sets of results, the standard deviation 
across the days is above 16 percentage points, revealing substantial day to day variation. 
 
The point estimate for the futures market information share is greater than 0.5 on over 85% of 
days. Using bootstrap generated confidence intervals, we find that 51.4% and 36.1% of days, 
according to the GG and Hasbrouck results respectively, had futures market information shares 
significantly greater than one-half. Futures market shares that were significantly less than one-
half were only observed on 4.2% or 1.0% of days for the two techniques. Finally, the futures and 
cash market information shares were insignificantly different from 0.5 on 44.4% of days for the 
GG results and 62.9% for the Hasbrouck. 
 
The results using the transactions prices instead of the mid-quote reveal more or less the same 
pattern but attribute a slightly smaller share to the futures market, 59.9% when using the GG 
methodology and 71.9%-76.1% for Hasbrouck. The day-to-day variation when using the   20 
transaction data was higher which is also shown in the fact that only just over 20% of days 
revealed a futures market information share of greater than one-half.  
 
In sum, it appears that  about  70%  of price discovery  in the Canadian market for  10-year 
government debt occurs on the futures market. These results are quite similar to those recorded 
in Campbell, Chung, and Hendry (2007) which estimated basically the same model but also 
imposed restrictions to ensure the GG information share was in the [0, 1] range and that the 
cointegrating vector b etween futures and cash market prices was (1,  -1). Although these 
restrictions did have a substantial effect on certain days’ results, they did not affect the overall or 
contract averages.  
 
To provide a flavour for the overall results,  Figure 1 plots the  daily  estimates for the GG 
information shares for the September 2004 contract based on both quote and trade data. The 
qualitative  nature of the results for the other contracts is quite similar. We see that there is 
substantial day-to-day variability and, as is possible with the GG technique, that some days even 
go outside the [0, 1] range.
8 The mean information share for the futures market during this 
contract was 68.8% with almost 64% of the days being significantly above one-half. The results 
for the Hasbrouck bounds for the September 2004 contract can be found in Figure 2. Note that 
the bounds are fairly tight and generally above one-half. About 55% of days, however, have an 
information share range for the futures market that is not significantly different from  0.5.  
 
Price discovery for the U.S. market was investigated for the futures pit and the GovPx spot 
market for the period from January 2000 to May 2001. Information shares were also estimated 
for the futures pit, the electronic futures platform, and the GovPx spot market using the last three 
contracts of the GovPx sample, starting in September 2000 with the advent of electronic futures 
trading on the CBOT. Finally, information shares were calculated from April 2002 to December 
2005 across the two futures markets and the electronic spot market covered by BrokerTec.  The 
results for the GG information share in the two futures markets are presented in Table 5a. The 
GG information share for the spot market is, of course, just one minus the share(s) for the futures 
market(s).  The Hasbrouck information shares are given in Table 5b for the futures and spot 
                                                   
8 The exclusion of days outside the [0, 1] range does not significantly change the results.   21 
markets. In a trivariate system, the Hasbrouck ranges do not sum to one (the point estimates 
computed for each Choleski ordering do sum to one), so the cash market information share is 
also given.
9 but the Hasbrouck lower and upper bounds need not sum to one with more than two 
markets. 
 
During the first sub-sample in 2000 and 2001, the futures pit accounted for an average of 62.6% 
of price discovery when compared against the spot market covered by GovPx. The information 
share increased from 15.8% for the March 2000 contract to 85.6% for the June 2001 contract. 
The Hasbrouck information share revealed an overall average range of 68.8% to 74.4% and an 
increase during the sample from 23.5%-25.3% for the first contract to 90.5%-94.7% for the last. 
The very tight bands estimated by the Hasbrouck methodology may imply that the sampling 
frequency of 30 seconds may actually be too high for this sample. The increased share of price 
discovery attributed to the futures market is consistent with the decline in trading that occurred at 
the inter-dealer voice brokers covered by GovPx during 2000 and 2001. 
 
Information shares are also calculated across the three markets - pit futures, electronic futures, 
and GovPx - for the sample from September 5, 2000 to May 29, 2001. Right from the beginning 
of electronic futures trading, that market contributed substantially to price discovery. By the end 
of the first week of trading, the electronic futures market was accounting for about 30-40% of 
price discovery each day. The average GG information share over the first contract was 38.8% 
while the Hasbrouck share was 14-56%. This proportion continued to rise so that by the June 
2001 contract the average information shares were 47% and 17-77% for the GG and Hasbrouck, 
respectively. The futures pit was contributing 70% of price discovery for the September 2000 
contract which was the last contract before electronic futures trading began. The  pit’s 
information share fell to about 40% according to the GG methodology during the December 
2000 contract implying that about three-quarters of the electronic futures market’s information 
share came from the pit and about one-quarter from the spot market. Ideally, we would also like 
to add data from BrokerTec for this sample since it began operation in August 2000. However, 
that intraday data is not available. 
                                                   
9 The point estimates computed for each Choleski ordering do sum to one but the Hasbrouck lower and upper 
bounds need not sum to one with more than two markets.   22 
 
Tables 5c and 5d contain the results when computing GG and Hasbrouck information shares, 
respectively, across the futures pit, electronic pit, and BrokerTec electronic  inter-dealer spot 
market from April 2002 to December 2005. These results show about 16.2% of price discovery 
in the futures pit, about 50.5% on the electronic futures market, and the remainder on the spot 
market when judging by the GG statistics. The Hasbrouck methodology revealed information 
share bands of about 5.7%-14.5% for the futures pit and 54.8% to 71.8% for the electronic 
futures market. The contract-by-contract results show that the information shares for both futures 
markets has declined over time. The futures pit has essentially declined steadily since the start of 
the sample, not surprising given the growth of electronic futures trading during that time. In 
addition, the information share for the electronic futures market has declined since the start of 
2004. Until the end of December 2003, the electronic futures information share averaged 66% 
while from January 2004 until the end of 2005 the information share for this market was only 
36%. Before this break point, some 52% of days had an electronic futures market information 
share that was significantly greater than 0.5 while afterward there were 69% of days with an 
information share significantly less than 0.5. (Using Hasbrouck shares, the percentage of days 
significantly above 0.5 fell from 70% to 5%.) This sharp decline coincided with changes that 
occurred in the underlying clearing and settlement system and the electronic trading platform at 
the CBOT on January 1, 2004.  While these changes generated a significant savings in risk 
capital for firms trading on the CBOT, it seems that they may have also contributed to a decline 
in the amount of price discovery that occurred in the futures market. Recall from Table 1 that the 
number of trades on the futures markets declined post-January 2004 while trading on BrokerTec 
continued to explode. This decline in the number of trades may have contributed to the declining 
information share. This will be investigated further in the next section. The advent of futures 
trading on Eurex in February of 2004 may have also contributed to the declining information 
shares for the CBOT futures market over 2004 and 2005.  The fact that the number of contracts 
traded on the CBOT did not decline, however, and that Eurex trading finally halted in June 2005 
with no apparent increase in CBOT information shares suggests that competition from Eurex did 
not take a significant proportion of price discovery from the CBOT.  
   23 
Figures 4 and 5 plot the information shares for three example contracts: March 2003, March 
2004, and December 2005. The beginning of the decline in the electronic futures market share 
can be seen toward the end of the March 2004 contract period while the December 2005 contract 
clearly shows a much lower information share. The daily volatility of the information shares is 
also quite apparent in the U.S. data much as it was in the Canadian results.  
 
Table 6 combines the U.S. and Canadian results from Tables 4 and 5a-d, respectively, for only 
the contracts that are in common. The pit and electronic futures markets are combined for the 
U.S. to give the picture for the total futures market since there is only one futures market in 
Canada. The first four contacts show higher futures market information shares for the U.S. But 
starting with the March 2004 contract, there is a marked decline in the U.S. futures market price 
discovery share such that by the end of the sample it is substantially under the Canadian 
estimates. The greater information share for the futures market in Canada could be explained in 
part by the much higher level of activity on the BrokerTec spot market platform in the U.S. This 
is an electronic trading platform with a two-thirds market share for inter-dealer trading. This is in 
comparison to CanPx for Canada which is an amalgamation of screen-based voice-brokers for 
the inter-dealer market. Spot market electronic trading in the U.S. can deliver bid-ask spreads 
that are almost as low as for the futures market which may help explain how this market can be 
contributing more and more to price discovery over time as well as more than the Canadian spot 
market. 
 
Tables 7 and 8 present results in the spirit of Yan and Zivot (2004). First, Table 7 reports the 
cumulative deviation from the new long-run value following shocks to the VECM while Table 8 
uses the same impulse response functions to compute the average number of minutes needed to 
come within 10% of the long-run asymptotic value.
10 Lower cumulative deviations and time until 
convergence to the long-run value imply a market is more efficient and exhibits greater price 
discovery. Also reported are the 5
th and 95
th percentiles across 1000 bootstrap simulations. The 
contract-by-contract results are shown for the Canadian case and the U.S. case using only the 
BrokerTec data given the greater reliability of these data. Only the average results are shown for 
                                                   
10 Campbell, Chung, and Hendry (2007) also compute these statistics when examining the Canadian data but for a 
slightly different specification of the model.   24 
the GovPx sample period. Note that the Canadian and U.S. results are not directly comparable 
when considering the cumulative deviation from fundamental value because the sampling 
frequency is different in the two cases. The Canadian estimation is done with a 30-second 
sampling interval while the U.S. estimation uses a 5-second interval. This will tend to make the 
U.S. cumulative sums larger by construction even if the path of convergence is identical. The 
estimates for the number of minutes until the fundamental value is reached (Table 8) are 
independent of the sampling frequency and, as such, are directly comparable across the two 
countries.  
 
Both countries reveal cumulative deviations that are at least twice as large in the spot market as 
in the electronic futures market. For the U.S., deviations for the futures pit are between those of 
the electronic futures market and the spot market, and are significantly different from both. This 
finding mimics the information share results by implying that the majority of price discovery 
occurs on the futures market. The Canadian markets show declining cumulative deviations over 
the sample period as well as a declining difference between the markets. 39.5% of days showed 
spot market deviations that were significantly larger than for the futures market. Only 4% of days 
showed the reverse. The U.S. electronic futures market actually shows an increase in t he 
deviations over the sample while the spot market shows a marked decline primarily in early 
2004. Over the last seven contracts there is essentially no difference in the cumulative deviations 
for the spot and electronic futures markets. 
 
Qualitatively similar results are seen in Table 8. The spot markets take significantly longer to 
reach the new long-run fundamental value following a shock. The U.S. took 5.7, 5.3, and 8.2 
minutes on average for the pit, electronic futures, and spot markets, respectively, to discover the 
new fundamental prices. In Canada, the futures and spot markets took 6.1 and 9.7 minutes, 
respectively. The difference between the U.S. spot and electronic futures market disappeared 
beginning with the June 2004 contract. Since that time, there has been no significant difference 
between the two markets. For the common sample period, the Canadian markets took 
significantly longer to respond to shocks than the comparable U.S. market. Interestingly, 
however, the U.S. markets show a marked increase in the time taken for price discovery starting 
with the March 2005 contract period such that the latest observations are as high or higher than   25 
the older Canadian estimates. This latest increase in the U.S. reverses to some extent the declines 
in both the futures and spot market times that occurred in early 2004. These declines may be 
partly attributable to the changes in the futures trading framework at the CBOT in January 2004 
but that does not explain why the spot market convergence times also declined.  One final 
observation is that, despite the significant differences in the overall mean results, about 63% of 
days in Canada and 50% in the U.S. show no significant differences in the convergence times for 
spot and electronic futures markets. 
 
 
6.  The Determinants of Information Shares  
 
Table 9  presents the results of regressions that attempt to explain daily movements in the 
Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck futures information-share measures in terms of various market 
features. These include the percentage bid/ask spread, the number of trades, and the realized 
volatility for the cash and futures markets. Realized volatility for a market is computed as the 
daily standard deviation of five-minute returns. Higher spreads in the futures market indicates 
higher trading costs or lower liquidity and should lead to less price discovery in the futures 
market. In contrast, higher spreads in the cash market should push informed trading toward the 
futures market and increase its information shares. A greater number of trades in the futures 
market indicate more liquidity and should raise the market’s information share. More trading in 
the cash market will draw price discovery away from the futures market. Volatility in the futures 
market could drive informed trading and price discovery toward the cash market and reduce 
futures market information shares. The reverse would happen for increased volatility in the cash 
market. 
 
The  spread, trade, and volatility  variables are standardized by their standard deviations to 
facilitate comparisons. These variables are included separately in some equations  and as a ratio 
of one market to another in other equations. In addition, dummy variables are included in the 
Canadian specifications for the first three days of a contract and for contracts after the first one.
11  
                                                   
11 Day-to-day changes in price discovery were not explained by day-of-the-week effects or the presence of macro 
news announcements.   26 
 
In general, the equations fit the weakest for the futures-pit information shares for both the 
BrokerTec and GovPx samples. The equations for Canadian and U.S. electronic futures market 
shares fit much better. In the Canadian case, bid-ask spreads, the number of trades, and volatility 
all have a roll to play in explaining the day-to-day variability of the GG information shares. The 
coefficients with respect to spreads and volatility conform with expectations. Higher spreads in 
the futures market decrease the information share while larger spreads in the cash market raise 
the futures market share. The same is true for the volatility measures, although the futures market 
volatility is not significant. Trading in the futures market has no affect but more trading in the 
cash market seemed to actually  have the perverse affect of increasing the futures market 
information share. When expressed as ratios of the futures market to the cash market, higher 
spread and volatility ratios significantly decreased price d iscovery shares. Relatively better 
conditions (lower volatility and spreads) on the futures market moves price discovery toward that 
market. Even when expressed as a ratio, trading activity had a perverse, albeit weak, affect on 
shares. Similar results are seen for the midpoint of the Hasbrouck bands but the fit was poorer. 
Two final points of interest are that there was a small shift up in futures market price discovery 
after the first contract and that the first three days of a new contract seemed to have significantly 
lower price discovery for the futures market. 
 
In the U.S. case using BrokerTec data, the fit was much better for the electronic futures market 
information share than for the futures pit. For the pit, the expected effects were found for the 
volatility and number of trade variables but the opposite effect was found for the spread 
variables.  The fit was much higher for the electronic futures market, where  much of the 
explanatory power came from spreads and the number of trades. Higher spreads in the electronic 
futures market relative to the spot market significantly lowered the futures market share of price 
discovery. Relatively higher levels of trading activity in the futures market compared to the cash 
market raised the futures market share. The volatility variables had the correct signs but only 
weak effects. Greater trading on the pit market tended to raise the information share of the 
electronic market but this probably reflects some form of colinearity with the other variables. 
Recall that the trading levels for the futures market and spreads for the BrokerTec spot market 
declined after January 2004 and these are largely responsible for the fall in the information   27 
shares for the futures market over the subsequent period. There is, however, still some marginal 
decline in the information shares over the 2004-05 period that is unexplained.  
 
Movements in the futures market GG information share during the GovPx sample are mostly 
explained by changes in trading activity. Higher futures market trading raises shares while cash 
market trading has the opposite effect. Hasbrouck shares are also explained by spreads although 
the sign does not conform with expectations.  
 
Table 10 gives the results for the same equations as Table 9 but estimated in first difference to 
remove the trend component from the variables. The fit of the equations is, not surprisingly, 
much poorer especially for the Hasbrouck midpoint and for the GovPx and futures pit 
specifications. The qualitative flavour of the results is, however, quite similar. Higher spreads 
and volatility tend to reduce price discovery while more trading raises it. 
 
In sum, bid-ask spreads, levels of trading activity, and volatility all have a role to play in 
explaining the day-to-day variation in the estimated information shares. Some of the effects are 
contrary to expectation and warrant further analysis. Much of the day-to-day variation in price 
discovery is still unexplained.  
 
 
7.  Conclusions and Future Research 
 
This paper examines the contribution to price discovery by futures and cash markets for 10-year 
Government debt in both Canada and the U.S. This is an interesting question given the relatively 
little attention that fixed-income markets have received in the microstructure literature. Research 
has typically found that futures markets with their generally lower level of transaction costs 
dominate price discovery. Our work verifies this expectation but finds some interesting changes 
in the data over the sample. 
 
About 70% of price discovery occurs on the futures market in Canada. Over the full sample since 
early 2002, a similar amount of price discovery occurred on the combined futures pit and   28 
electronic futures markets in the U.S. There has, however, been a declining degree of price 
discovery that has occurred on the U.S. futures markets since early 2004. Towards the end of 
2005, only just over 30% of price discovery was attributed to the electronic futures market while 
the futures pit still accounted for around 10%. The declining information shares for the U.S. 
futures market is in part attributable to changes in the trading platform that occurred in January 
2004. These changes reduced the number of trades per day on the market and, even though the 
overall number of contracts traded continued to increase, contributed to the decline in price 
discovery. The continued strong growth in spot market trading also helped to transfer price 
discovery to the spot market. 
 
Future work will focus on expanding the specification of the underlying VECM to model the 
effects of such variables as order flow and macro news announcements. This will help us to 
better understand how much price discovery comes from trading in each market and how much 
from other factors.  29 
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Contract  Canada United States
March 2000 [1] 34.0
June 2000 [2] 61.0
September 2000 [3] 61.0
December 2000 [4] 56.0
March 2001 [5] 40.0




June 2002 [10] 58.0 34.0
September 2002 [11] 52.0 61.0
December 2002 [12] 53.0 57.0
March 2003 [13] 55.0 54.0
June 2003 [14] 60.0
September 2003 [15] 63.0
December 2003 [16] 57.0
March 2004 [17] 54.0 54.0
June 2004 [18] 58.0 62.0
September 2004 [19] 55.0 59.0
December 2004 [20] 56.0
March 2005 [18] 57.0
June 2005 [19] 61.0
September 2005 [20] 64.0
December 2005 [21] 57.0
Sample: 10-13, 17-19 385.0
Sample: 1 - 6 292.0
Sample: 10 - 21 856.0
Note: The numbers in square brackets serve only to enumerate the contracts.
Table 1: Number of Days in Sample
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Contract Maturity
CGB CanPx Futures - Pit Futures - Elec GovPx BrokerTec
March 2000 [1] 904.1 201.0
June 2000 [2] 937.6 143.0
September 2000 [3] 745.0 101.8
December 2000 [4] 724.2 1763.4 83.1
March 2001 [5] 971.6 2385.2 67.4
June 2001 [6] 945.9 3610.0 58.1
September 2001 [7] 693.8 4856.5
December 2001 [8] 1041.8 6804.5
March 2002 [9] 1257.5 10694.5
June 2002 [10] 542.1 33.1 1080.8 12752.7 969.2
September 2002 [11] 551.4 32.4 1442.7 21221.4 1158.4
December 2002 [12] 624.0 36.3 1416.6 25206.1 1463.9
March 2003 [13] 837.1 32.1 1138.4 23631.1 1167.4
June 2003 [14] 1196.4 30183.1 1395.5
September 2003 [15] 1550.6 38937.8 1769.5
December 2003 [16] 1234.5 40952.6 2248.9
March 2004 [17] 744.1 41.9 1273.8 23559.6 2368.4
June 2004 [18] 905.2 41.0 1206.5 16846.8 3009.3
September 2004 [19] 962.9 34.8 612.3 14003.6 3039.8
December 2004 [20] 609.7 17432.7 4223.6
March 2005 [18] 481.5 13952.7 4509.9
June 2005 [19] 489.9 15627.8 5498.5
September 2005 [20] 357.3 12192.6 5702.4
December 2005 [21] 376.0 13580.2 7826.6
Full Sample 740.2 36.0 5154.4 21549.5 108.9 3162.5
Canada United States
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Contract Maturity
CGB CanPx Futures - Pit Futures - Elec GovPx BrokerTec
March 2000 [1] 1.72 2.70
June 2000 [2] 1.65 2.96
September 2000 [3] 1.61 2.63
December 2000 [4] 1.61 1.65 2.75
March 2001 [5] 1.58 1.68 4.53
June 2001 [6] 1.55 1.57 5.05
September 2001 [7] 1.51 1.53
December 2001 [8] 1.48 1.51
March 2002 [9] 1.51 1.54
June 2002 [10] 4.84 7.20 1.50 1.52 4.30
September 2002 [11] 4.83 7.55 1.45 1.46 5.23
December 2002 [12] 4.61 7.43 1.38 1.40 4.93
March 2003 [13] 2.94 6.43 1.38 1.40 4.00
June 2003 [14] 1.36 1.37 3.30
September 2003 [15] 1.37 1.39 4.41
December 2003 [16] 1.40 1.42 3.21
March 2004 [17] 3.47 6.38 1.41 1.41 2.48
June 2004 [18] 2.97 5.59 1.41 1.45 2.07
September 2004 [19] 2.67 5.65 1.45 1.47 1.88
December 2004 [20] 1.41 1.41 1.81
March 2005 [21] 1.42 1.42 1.78
June 2005 [22] 1.45 1.44 1.83
September 2005 [23] 1.45 1.41 1.72
December 2005 [24] 1.49 1.44 1.69
Full Sample 3.75 6.59 1.49 1.48 3.20 2.86
Spreads are calculated as a percentage of the mid-point of the bid and ask prices and are expressed in basis points. The spread for the 
U.S. futures markets are estimated as the mean price change whenever there was a price change. All other spreads are computed 
directly from quote data.
Canada United States
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Contract Maturity
Mean Std.Dev. %Days>0.5 %Days<0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days>0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days<0.5
June 2002 [10] Quotes 0.585 0.155 0.207 0.103 0.623 0.204 0.155 0.720 0.198 0.034
Trades 0.525 0.210 0.086 0.172 0.651 0.230 0.121 0.696 0.226 0.034
Sept. 2002 [11] Quotes 0.685 0.155 0.577 0.000 0.716 0.176 0.385 0.818 0.141 0.000
Trades 0.555 0.180 0.077 0.096 0.689 0.211 0.173 0.732 0.207 0.019
Dec. 2002 [12] Quotes 0.680 0.170 0.547 0.038 0.709 0.195 0.377 0.811 0.162 0.000
Trades 0.569 0.204 0.151 0.151 0.704 0.225 0.226 0.746 0.221 0.000
March 2003 [13] Quotes 0.703 0.163 0.455 0.036 0.722 0.188 0.345 0.823 0.154 0.000
Trades 0.650 0.227 0.309 0.073 0.760 0.261 0.382 0.790 0.258 0.000
March 2004 [17] Quotes 0.713 0.153 0.667 0.037 0.736 0.163 0.444 0.840 0.139 0.000
Trades 0.632 0.227 0.278 0.111 0.760 0.204 0.259 0.800 0.200 0.019
June 2004 [18] Quotes 0.692 0.159 0.534 0.000 0.703 0.178 0.414 0.825 0.129 0.000
Trades 0.624 0.201 0.241 0.052 0.723 0.198 0.293 0.772 0.184 0.000
Sept. 2004 [19] Quotes 0.688 0.196 0.636 0.073 0.704 0.207 0.418 0.821 0.172 0.036
Trades 0.640 0.238 0.273 0.127 0.752 0.250 0.364 0.792 0.245 0.036
Full Sample Quotes 0.677 0.169 0.514 0.042 0.701 0.190 0.361 0.808 0.162 0.010
Trades 0.599 0.216 0.203 0.112 0.719 0.228 0.260 0.761 0.222 0.016
The reported statistics are computed across the daily estimates for the contract. The columns "%Days>0.5" and "%Days<0.5" are the proportion of days for which 
the 90% bootstrap confidence interval for the daily information share was above or below 0.5, respectively.
Table 4: Canadian Futures Market Price Discovery Information Shares
Hasbrouck UB Gonzalo-Granger Hasbrouck LB




























Mean Std.Dev. %Days>0.5 %Days<0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days>0.5 %Days<0.5
March 2000 [1] GovPx - bi 0.158 0.833 0.088 0.471 - - - -
June 2000 [2] GovPx - bi 0.390 0.761 0.197 0.246 - - - -
Sept. 2000 [3] GovPx - bi 0.783 0.234 0.639 0.016 - - - -
Dec. 2000 [4] GovPx - bi 0.653 0.249 0.286 0.071 - - - -
GovPx - tri 0.397 0.203 0.037 0.463 0.388 0.259 0.000 0.389
March 2001 [5] GovPx - bi 0.880 0.165 0.825 0.000 - - - -
GovPx - tri 0.442 0.157 0.025 0.200 0.469 0.202 0.075 0.200
June 2001 [6] GovPx - bi 0.856 0.173 0.575 0.000 - - - -
GovPx - tri 0.384 0.163 0.000 0.375 0.467 0.175 0.025 0.175
Contracts 1 - 6 GovPx - bi 0.626 0.539 0.432 0.123 - - - -
Contracts 4 - 6 GovPx - tri 0.406 0.179 0.022 0.358 0.436 0.222 0.030 0.269
This table reports Gonzalo-Granger information shares for the U.S. futures markets. GovPx - bi reports shares from the bivariate system of futures pit and
spot market prices while GovPx - tri reports shares for the trivariate system of futures pit, electronic futures, and spot market prices. See additional notes 
with Table 4.
Information Share: Electronic Futures
Gonzalo-Granger
Table 5a: US Futures Market Price Discovery Gonzalo-Granger Information Shares
Gonzalo-Granger
Information Share: Futures Pit
 
Contract Maturity
Mean Std.Dev. %Days>0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days<0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days>0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days<0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days>0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days<0.5
March 2000 [1] GovPx - bi 0.235 0.305 0.059 0.253 0.313 0.294 - - - - - - 0.747 0.335 0.294 0.765 0.329 0.029
June 2000 [2] GovPx - bi 0.470 0.373 0.180 0.520 0.397 0.197 - - - - - - 0.480 0.396 0.197 0.530 0.375 0.164
Sept. 2000 [3] GovPx - bi 0.853 0.178 0.754 0.916 0.150 0.000 - - - - - - 0.084 0.095 0.000 0.147 0.143 0.738
Dec. 2000 [4] GovPx - bi 0.696 0.200 0.321 0.802 0.182 0.018 - - - - - - 0.198 0.182 0.018 0.304 0.200 0.321
GovPx - tri 0.241 0.150 0.019 0.660 0.170 0.000 0.144 0.098 0.074 0.558 0.123 0.000 0.174 0.173 0.000 0.283 0.209 0.315
March 2001 [5] GovPx - bi 0.927 0.085 0.800 0.954 0.065 0.000 - - - - - - 0.046 0.065 0.000 0.073 0.085 0.800
GovPx - tri 0.199 0.119 0.000 0.768 0.135 0.000 0.168 0.112 0.000 0.736 0.136 0.000 0.057 0.085 0.000 0.091 0.111 0.725
June 2001 [6] GovPx - bi 0.905 0.102 0.625 0.947 0.062 0.000 - - - - - - 0.053 0.062 0.000 0.095 0.102 0.625
GovPx - tri 0.144 0.091 0.000 0.736 0.114 0.000 0.173 0.091 0.000 0.766 0.176 0.000 0.080 0.085 0.000 0.132 0.122 0.450
Contracts 1 - 6 GovPx - bi 0.688 0.333 0.459 0.744 0.338 0.079 - - - - - - 0.256 0.331 0.079 0.312 0.327 0.449
Contracts 4 - 6 GovPx - tri 0.200 0.131 0.007 0.715 0.151 0.000 0.160 0.100 0.030 0.673 0.177 0.000 0.111 0.138 0.000 0.181 0.181 0.478
This table reports Hasbrouck information shares for the U.S. futures and spot markets. GovPx - bi reports shares from the bivariate system of futures pit and spot market prices while GovPx - tri reports shares for the trivariate system of futures pit, electronic futures,  
and spot market prices. See additional notes with Table 4. 
Table 5b: US Futures and Spot Market Price Discovery Hasbrouck Information Shares
Information Share: Futures Pit
Hasbrouck UB Hasbrouck UB Hasbrouck LB
Information Share: Spot Market Information Share: Electronic Futures
Hasbrouck LB Hasbrouck UB Hasbrouck LB
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Contract Maturity
Mean Std.Dev. %Days>0.5 %Days<0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days>0.5 %Days<0.5
June 2002 [10] BrokerTec 0.252 0.047 0.000 1.000 0.545 0.102 0.235 0.147
Sept. 2002 [11] BrokerTec 0.174 0.131 0.000 1.000 0.745 0.179 0.787 0.000
Dec. 2002 [12] BrokerTec 0.137 0.102 0.000 1.000 0.698 0.193 0.737 0.035
March 2003 [13] BrokerTec 0.210 0.139 0.000 0.963 0.640 0.177 0.481 0.037
June 2003 [14] BrokerTec 0.215 0.082 0.000 0.950 0.616 0.145 0.367 0.017
Sept. 2003 [15] BrokerTec 0.176 0.106 0.000 0.968 0.660 0.142 0.508 0.000
Dec. 2003 [16] BrokerTec 0.170 0.090 0.000 0.912 0.675 0.216 0.439 0.018
March 2004 [17] BrokerTec 0.155 0.115 0.000 0.981 0.589 0.177 0.296 0.074
June 2004 [18] BrokerTec 0.148 0.097 0.000 1.000 0.438 0.128 0.048 0.484
Sept. 2004 [19] BrokerTec 0.179 0.084 0.000 0.983 0.390 0.138 0.051 0.661
Dec. 2004 [20] BrokerTec 0.148 0.094 0.000 1.000 0.358 0.100 0.000 0.679
March 2005 [21] BrokerTec 0.137 0.124 0.000 0.982 0.296 0.108 0.000 0.807
June 2005 [22] BrokerTec 0.134 0.108 0.000 0.984 0.342 0.105 0.000 0.803
Sept. 2005 [23] BrokerTec 0.114 0.127 0.000 0.953 0.304 0.135 0.016 0.797
Dec. 2005 [24] BrokerTec 0.126 0.096 0.000 1.000 0.304 0.095 0.000 0.877
Contracts 15 - 24 BrokerTec 0.162 0.111 0.000 0.978 0.505 0.218 0.264 0.371
See additional notes with Table 4. 
Information Share: Electronic Futures
Gonzalo-Granger
Table 5c: US Futures Market Price Discovery Gonzalo Granger Information Shares
Gonzalo-Granger


















Mean Std.Dev. %Days>0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days<0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days>0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days<0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days>0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days<0.5
June 2002 [10] BrokerTec 0.137 0.058 0.000 0.263 0.066 0.971 0.625 0.110 0.559 0.768 0.115 0.000 0.088 0.092 0.000 0.124 0.107 0.912
Sept. 2002 [11] BrokerTec 0.061 0.046 0.000 0.172 0.079 1.000 0.777 0.109 0.852 0.898 0.082 0.000 0.039 0.061 0.000 0.057 0.072 0.967
Dec. 2002 [12] BrokerTec 0.039 0.032 0.000 0.135 0.062 1.000 0.755 0.142 0.842 0.877 0.148 0.018 0.082 0.150 0.018 0.117 0.154 0.912
March 2003 [13] BrokerTec 0.092 0.056 0.000 0.207 0.076 0.981 0.705 0.117 0.759 0.842 0.103 0.000 0.062 0.094 0.000 0.099 0.118 0.907
June 2003 [14] BrokerTec 0.079 0.049 0.000 0.206 0.067 0.983 0.684 0.094 0.517 0.839 0.084 0.000 0.077 0.073 0.000 0.125 0.094 0.833
Sept. 2003 [15] BrokerTec 0.053 0.085 0.000 0.160 0.089 0.984 0.724 0.137 0.683 0.867 0.126 0.000 0.077 0.105 0.000 0.127 0.135 0.778
Dec. 2003 [16] BrokerTec 0.038 0.033 0.000 0.137 0.059 1.000 0.715 0.131 0.649 0.870 0.109 0.000 0.088 0.116 0.000 0.166 0.157 0.737
March 2004 [17] BrokerTec 0.051 0.047 0.000 0.146 0.078 1.000 0.661 0.146 0.463 0.831 0.106 0.000 0.111 0.109 0.000 0.217 0.159 0.648
June 2004 [18] BrokerTec 0.054 0.049 0.000 0.136 0.083 1.000 0.495 0.166 0.048 0.685 0.169 0.016 0.247 0.188 0.016 0.403 0.203 0.290
Sept. 2004 [19] BrokerTec 0.069 0.049 0.000 0.140 0.073 1.000 0.463 0.177 0.102 0.644 0.194 0.000 0.270 0.173 0.000 0.433 0.196 0.271
Dec. 2004 [20] BrokerTec 0.052 0.044 0.000 0.122 0.070 1.000 0.399 0.142 0.000 0.610 0.167 0.036 0.321 0.184 0.036 0.517 0.186 0.071
March 2005 [21] BrokerTec 0.054 0.052 0.000 0.117 0.085 1.000 0.310 0.166 0.000 0.502 0.190 0.140 0.424 0.223 0.070 0.611 0.219 0.018
June 2005 [22] BrokerTec 0.043 0.043 0.000 0.112 0.069 1.000 0.331 0.141 0.000 0.571 0.161 0.033 0.368 0.171 0.000 0.600 0.180 0.016
Sept. 2005 [23] BrokerTec 0.035 0.037 0.000 0.087 0.064 1.000 0.302 0.183 0.016 0.494 0.197 0.156 0.453 0.221 0.063 0.646 0.220 0.047
Dec. 2005 [24] BrokerTec 0.036 0.040 0.000 0.085 0.062 1.000 0.292 0.131 0.000 0.511 0.161 0.105 0.436 0.182 0.070 0.657 0.162 0.018
Contracts 15 - 24 BrokerTec 0.057 0.054 0.000 0.145 0.084 0.995 0.546 0.230 0.357 0.718 0.210 0.035 0.214 0.215 0.019 0.334 0.278 0.480
See additional notes with Table 4. 
Information Share: Futures Pit
Hasbrouck UB
Table 5d: US Futures and Spot Market Price Discovery Hasbrouck Information Shares
Information Share: Spot Market
Hasbrouck LB Hasbrouck UB
Information Share: Electronic Futures
Hasbrouck LB Hasbrouck UB Hasbrouck LB38 
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Contract Maturity
Mean Std.Dev. %Days>0.5 %Days<0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days>0.5 Mean Std.Dev. %Days<0.5
June 2002 [10] CDN 0.585 0.155 0.207 0.103 0.623 0.204 0.155 0.720 0.198 0.034
US 0.797 0.114 0.941 0.000 0.876 0.107 0.912 0.912 0.092 0.000
Sept. 2002 [11] CDN 0.685 0.155 0.577 0.000 0.716 0.176 0.385 0.818 0.141 0.000
US 0.918 0.132 0.984 0.000 0.943 0.072 0.967 0.961 0.061 0.000
Dec. 2002 [12] CDN 0.680 0.170 0.547 0.038 0.709 0.195 0.377 0.811 0.162 0.000
US 0.835 0.177 0.930 0.018 0.883 0.154 0.912 0.918 0.150 0.018
March 2003 [13] CDN 0.703 0.163 0.455 0.036 0.722 0.188 0.345 0.823 0.154 0.000
US 0.849 0.153 0.944 0.000 0.901 0.118 0.907 0.938 0.094 0.000
March 2004 [17] CDN 0.713 0.153 0.667 0.037 0.736 0.163 0.444 0.840 0.139 0.000
US 0.744 0.181 0.611 0.000 0.783 0.159 0.648 0.889 0.109 0.000
June 2004 [18] CDN 0.692 0.159 0.534 0.000 0.703 0.178 0.414 0.825 0.129 0.000
US 0.586 0.156 0.306 0.048 0.597 0.203 0.290 0.753 0.188 0.016
Sept. 2004 [19] CDN 0.688 0.196 0.636 0.073 0.704 0.207 0.418 0.821 0.172 0.036
US 0.550 0.165 0.271 0.068 0.548 0.196 0.271 0.706 0.173 0.000
Average CDN 0.677 0.169 0.514 0.042 0.701 0.190 0.361 0.808 0.162 0.010
US 0.748 0.203 0.693 0.021 0.781 0.211 0.682 0.863 0.160 0.005
This table compares the Canadian futures market information shares with the combined shares for the U.S. futures pit and electronic futures markets. Additional notes are with Table 4.
Hasbrouck UB
Table 6: US - Canadian Comparison of Price Discovery Information Shares
Gonzalo-Granger
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Contract Maturity
5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95% Spot>Futures Futures>Spot No Difference
June 2002 [10] CDN 0.035 0.036 0.042 0.049 0.057 0.059 0.009 0.021 0.022 0.224 0.103 0.672
US 0.023 0.024 0.032 0.018 0.019 0.025 0.067 0.076 0.080 0.045 0.057 0.059 0.912 0.029 0.059
Sept. 2002 [11] CDN 0.029 0.031 0.037 0.061 0.073 0.083 0.028 0.042 0.051 0.462 0.000 0.538
US 0.049 0.058 0.071 0.027 0.031 0.044 0.130 0.151 0.160 0.097 0.120 0.123 0.918 0.000 0.082
Dec. 2002 [12] CDN 0.028 0.029 0.035 0.055 0.069 0.074 0.022 0.040 0.044 0.396 0.038 0.566
US 0.065 0.073 0.085 0.042 0.046 0.059 0.126 0.145 0.154 0.076 0.099 0.102 0.789 0.018 0.193
March 2003 [13] CDN 0.024 0.023 0.030 0.051 0.063 0.065 0.023 0.040 0.038 0.382 0.018 0.600
US 0.060 0.080 0.100 0.031 0.039 0.059 0.099 0.114 0.129 0.060 0.075 0.078 0.833 0.000 0.167
June 2003 [10] CDN
US 0.060 0.082 0.101 0.040 0.044 0.065 0.115 0.145 0.158 0.064 0.102 0.105 0.750 0.000 0.250
Sept. 2003 [11] CDN
US 0.068 0.070 0.104 0.064 0.070 0.102 0.159 0.198 0.211 0.068 0.128 0.137 0.619 0.016 0.365
Dec. 2003 [12] CDN
US 0.076 0.095 0.113 0.063 0.082 0.100 0.137 0.181 0.193 0.063 0.098 0.103 0.579 0.018 0.404
March 2004 [17] CDN 0.020 0.020 0.024 0.044 0.048 0.050 0.021 0.028 0.029 0.426 0.037 0.537
US 0.046 0.049 0.069 0.038 0.041 0.062 0.089 0.116 0.127 0.041 0.075 0.074 0.500 0.000 0.500
June 2004 [18] CDN 0.023 0.024 0.029 0.046 0.052 0.055 0.020 0.028 0.029 0.414 0.017 0.569
US 0.059 0.063 0.073 0.050 0.054 0.064 0.055 0.063 0.072 -0.005 0.009 0.017 0.194 0.113 0.694
Sept. 2004 [19] CDN 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.037 0.042 0.047 0.014 0.022 0.024 0.473 0.055 0.473
US 0.040 0.043 0.051 0.031 0.035 0.042 0.045 0.058 0.062 0.009 0.023 0.024 0.271 0.051 0.678
Dec. 2004 [12] CDN
US 0.045 0.049 0.061 0.036 0.040 0.052 0.039 0.048 0.057 -0.005 0.009 0.013 0.143 0.071 0.786
March 2005 [13] CDN
US 0.080 0.089 0.114 0.068 0.077 0.102 0.059 0.076 0.099 -0.027 -0.001 0.015 0.053 0.158 0.789
June 2005 [10] CDN
US 0.064 0.067 0.088 0.056 0.059 0.080 0.053 0.064 0.085 -0.019 0.006 0.020 0.066 0.148 0.787
Sept. 2005 [11] CDN
US 0.089 0.109 0.127 0.078 0.098 0.116 0.062 0.081 0.103 -0.030 -0.018 -0.001 0.078 0.172 0.750
Dec. 2005 [12] CDN
US 0.062 0.070 0.084 0.050 0.058 0.073 0.044 0.057 0.065 -0.020 -0.001 0.006 0.035 0.070 0.895
Average CDN 0.028 0.026 0.030 0.052 0.058 0.057 0.023 0.031 0.029 0.395 0.039 0.566
US: Cdn sample 0.055 0.058 0.064 0.039 0.039 0.046 0.094 0.104 0.105 0.052 0.065 0.061 0.609 0.031 0.360
US: full sample 0.068 0.070 0.076 0.055 0.054 0.062 0.096 0.106 0.105 0.038 0.052 0.047 0.433 0.060 0.507
US: GovPx sample 0.099 0.293 0.146 0.158 0.508 0.242
The numbers are averages over each contract of the daily estimates. They represent the cumulative deviation from the new long-run fundamental value of the market's price following a shock. For each day, the results are averaged 
across all possible impulse responses. For the bivariate Canadian case with two Choleski orderings there are four impulse responses representing each markets' response to each markets' shock. Each Choleski ordering is equally 
weighted while within each ordering, the impulses are weighted by the asympototic variance decomposition value. For the trivariate U.S. case, there are sixe Choleski orderings.
Table 7: Cumulative Deviation from Fundamental Value
% of Days of significant difference
Pit Futures Market Electronic Futures Market Spot Market Spot less Elec. Futures
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Contract Maturity
5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95% Spot>Futures Futures>Spot No Difference
June 2002 [10] CDN 7.689 8.200 8.995 8.900 10.402 10.097 0.294 2.202 2.020 0.224 0.121 0.655
US 2.179 2.232 2.936 1.896 1.957 2.540 5.466 6.109 6.327 3.194 4.152 4.161 0.912 0.029 0.059
Sept. 2002 [11] CDN 6.013 6.413 7.523 8.654 10.028 10.105 1.641 3.615 3.606 0.365 0.000 0.635
US 3.545 3.801 4.456 2.752 2.968 3.693 7.384 8.232 8.450 4.083 5.264 5.300 0.869 0.000 0.131
Dec. 2002 [12] CDN 5.900 6.349 7.920 8.045 9.951 9.797 0.722 3.602 3.435 0.340 0.057 0.604
US 5.006 5.626 6.298 4.241 4.470 5.604 7.432 8.468 8.760 2.256 3.998 4.078 0.702 0.035 0.263
March 2003 [13] CDN 6.342 6.148 8.612 9.722 12.023 11.621 1.761 5.875 4.751 0.273 0.036 0.691
US 3.677 3.994 4.919 2.836 2.918 3.941 7.195 8.074 8.353 3.795 5.156 4.989 0.796 0.000 0.204
June 2003 [10] CDN
US 4.568 5.215 6.263 3.690 4.066 5.378 8.189 10.276 10.076 3.305 6.209 5.867 0.717 0.000 0.283
Sept. 2003 [11] CDN
US 4.719 5.102 6.419 4.503 4.844 6.399 8.838 11.030 10.788 2.955 6.185 5.757 0.571 0.032 0.397
Dec. 2003 [12] CDN
US 5.370 6.920 7.215 5.314 7.405 7.411 9.116 11.835 11.147 2.516 4.430 5.075 0.526 0.018 0.456
March 2004 [17] CDN 4.596 4.716 5.537 7.001 7.725 7.791 1.754 3.009 2.917 0.370 0.037 0.593
US 3.486 3.952 4.951 3.277 3.760 5.062 6.544 8.436 8.296 2.073 4.676 4.413 0.500 0.000 0.500
June 2004 [18] CDN 5.563 5.810 6.651 7.943 8.991 8.939 1.615 3.181 3.062 0.310 0.017 0.672
US 4.725 5.268 6.155 4.477 5.064 6.079 4.966 5.943 6.341 -0.686 0.879 1.446 0.242 0.161 0.597
Sept. 2004 [19] CDN 5.010 5.301 6.324 7.422 8.545 8.684 1.553 3.244 3.277 0.382 0.055 0.564
US 3.601 3.989 4.676 2.966 3.267 4.248 4.595 5.877 5.792 0.806 2.609 2.374 0.322 0.034 0.644
Dec. 2004 [12] CDN
US 3.982 4.316 5.058 3.618 3.776 4.927 3.961 5.085 5.144 -0.631 1.310 1.185 0.232 0.071 0.696
March 2005 [13] CDN
US 7.937 7.963 10.584 7.597 8.493 10.583 6.721 8.331 9.292 -3.081 -0.162 0.928 0.140 0.123 0.737
June 2005 [10] CDN
US 6.244 6.569 8.715 5.913 6.309 8.670 6.074 7.662 8.266 -1.983 1.353 1.726 0.197 0.066 0.738
Sept. 2005 [11] CDN
US 9.436 11.375 12.023 9.255 11.180 12.227 7.824 9.185 10.148 -3.494 -1.995 -0.013 0.141 0.078 0.781
Dec. 2005 [12] CDN
US 6.356 7.224 8.217 5.693 6.378 7.899 5.785 7.573 7.532 -1.597 1.195 1.304 0.140 0.053 0.807
Average CDN 6.317 6.148 6.914 8.639 9.668 9.162 1.900 3.520 2.684 0.322 0.047 0.631
US: Cdn sample 4.194 4.251 4.665 3.658 3.595 4.175 6.598 7.347 7.094 2.598 3.752 3.260 0.598 0.039 0.362
US: full sample 5.669 5.706 6.126 5.270 5.258 5.783 7.308 8.215 7.761 1.673 2.957 2.343 0.452 0.048 0.500
US: GovPx sample 23.196 52.4387 29.643 17.377 33.6961 21.335
The table reports the average number of minuts taken to come within 10% of the new long-run asymptotic value for the impluse reponse following a shock. For additional notes see Table 7.
Table 8: Number of Minutes until Long-Run Equilibrium is Attained
% of Days of significant difference
Pit Futures Market Electronic Futures Market Spot Market Spot less Elec. Futures
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CDN CDN Btec - Pit Btec - Pit Btec - Elec Btec - Elec GovPx GovPx CDN CDN Btec - Pit Btec - Pit Btec - Elec Btec - Elec GovPx GovPx
Constant 0.486 1.217 0.186 0.016 0.412 1.695 1.922 -1.813 0.585 1.113 0.093 -0.060 0.529 0.609 1.959 -2.290
(7.731)*** (11.763)*** (2.147)** (0.222) (3.569)*** (7.676)*** (2.952)*** (-1.453) (8.565)*** (9.866)*** (1.811)* (-1.473) (4.314)*** (2.798)*** (5.658)*** (-3.331)***
FIRST DAYS
5
-0.150 -0.146 -0.164 -0.159
(-3.627)*** (-3.574)*** (-3.643)*** (-3.576)***
CONTRACT #11-#19 0.060 0.056 0.066 0.060
(2.575)** (2.538)** (2.611)*** (2.500)**
PIT SPREAD 0.003 0.005 -0.062 0.001 0.003 -0.054
(0.771) (1.092) (-1.722)* (0.627) (0.562) (-2.777)***
E. FUTURES SPREAD -0.051 0.002 -0.010 -0.037 0.003 -0.005
(-4.090)*** (0.526) (-1.730)* (-2.676)*** (1.323) (-0.850)
CASH SPREAD 0.038 -0.006 0.070 -0.047 0.030 -0.004 0.043 -0.042
(3.699)*** (-1.087) (9.735)*** (-0.998) (2.731)*** (-1.155) (5.582)*** (-1.679)*
PIT/E. FUTURES SPREAD RATIO -0.030 0.079 -0.034 0.023
(-0.138) (0.284) (-0.273) (0.083)
FUTURES/CASH SPREAD RATIO -0.629 0.312 -1.694 1.362 -0.448 0.202 -0.484 2.062
(-3.758)*** (4.649)*** (-8.193)*** (1.089) (-2.454)** (5.184)*** (-2.374)** (2.992)***
# OF TRADES - PIT 0.000 0.038 0.141 0.002 0.048 0.085
(-0.050) (4.299)*** (3.145)*** (0.581) (5.174)*** (3.585)***
# OF TRADES - E. FUTURES 0.006 0.003 0.049 0.006 -0.007 0.053
(0.561) (0.572) (6.594)*** (0.506) (-2.178)** (6.608)***
# OF TRADES - CASH 0.036 -0.033 -0.032 -0.218 0.026 -0.028 -0.057 -0.196
(3.758)*** (-7.247)*** (-5.191)*** (-5.221)*** (2.513)** (-10.300)*** (-8.719)*** (-8.860)***
PIT/E. FUTURES TRADE RATIO 0.016 -0.018 0.074 0.133
(0.300) (-0.304) (2.391)** (2.275)**
FUTURES/CASH TRADE RATIO -0.168 0.200 0.518 1.998 -0.095 0.145 0.700 1.912
(-1.914)* (6.005)*** (13.729)*** (5.214)*** (-0.995) (7.477)*** (18.820)*** (9.056)***
PIT FUTURES VOLATILITY -0.043 0.056 0.003 -0.022 0.046 -0.004
(-3.765)*** (3.739)*** (0.096) (-3.256)*** (2.885)*** (-0.204)
E. FUTURES VOLATILITY -0.023 -0.007 -0.024 -0.013 0.002 -0.021
(-1.514) (-0.586) (-1.397) (-0.817) (0.331) (-1.143)
CASH VOLATILITY 0.045 0.018 -0.001 -0.006 0.023 0.009 -0.018 -0.007
(2.766)*** (1.728)* (-0.058) (-0.145) (1.293) (1.464) (-1.218) (-0.327)
PIT/E. FUTURES VOLATILITY RATIO -0.177 0.228 -0.093 0.095
(-1.746)* (1.696)* (-1.584) (0.717)
FUTURES/CASH VOL. RATIO -0.555 -0.150 -0.121 0.091 -0.398 -0.061 -0.122 0.128
(-6.998)*** (-1.880)* (-1.153) (0.373) (-4.603)*** (-1.317) (-1.181) (0.948)
RSQ 0.219 0.245 0.145 0.068 0.611 0.579 0.166 0.146 0.127 0.151 0.173 0.146 0.563 0.594 0.367 0.303
#obs 385 385 875 875 875 875 292 292 385 385 875 875 875 875 292 292
The spread, trade, and volatility explanatory variables have been standardized by their standard deviation. t-ratios are in brackets on the second row of each entry.
First Days dummy is for first 3 days for each contract in the Canadian models. Contract #11-19 is one for these contracts and zero otherwise
Gonzalo-Granger
Table 9: Regression Results using Futures Market Daily Information Shares
Hasbrouck Midpoint
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CDN CDN Btec - Pit Btec - Pit Btec - Elec Btec - Elec GovPx GovPx CDN CDN Btec - Pit Btec - Pit Btec - Elec Btec - Elec GovPx GovPx
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.013) (0.032) (-0.035) (-0.037) (-0.097) (-0.003) (0.013) (-0.008) (0.019) (0.050) (-0.094) (-0.072) (-0.094) (0.013) (-0.002) (-0.023)
FIRST DAYS
5
-0.117 -0.113 -0.127 -0.122
(-1.841)* (-1.836)* (-1.820)* (-1.803)*
CONTRACT #2-#7 0.336 0.246 0.369 0.294
(1.481) (1.115) (1.481) (1.206)
PIT SPREAD 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.007
(0.843) (0.371) (0.030) (1.020) (-0.398) (0.481)
E. FUTURES SPREAD -0.064 -0.002 -0.016 -0.045 -0.001 -0.005
(-4.070)*** (-0.375) (-2.320)** (-2.607)*** (-0.307) (-0.736)
CASH SPREAD 0.035 -0.009 0.041 -0.046 0.028 -0.007 0.005 0.008
(3.035)*** (-0.812) (2.933)*** (-0.695) (2.235)** (-1.182) (0.377) (0.286)
PIT/E. FUTURES SPREAD RATIO -0.240 0.032 -0.141 -0.105
(-1.030) (0.118) (-1.100) (-0.385)
FUTURES/CASH SPREAD RATIO -0.552 0.542 -2.423 1.629 -0.421 0.356 -0.403 0.113
(-3.000)*** (3.921)*** (-6.173)*** (0.943) (-2.076)** (4.692)*** (-1.033) (0.152)
# OF TRADES - PIT -0.006 0.010 0.056 -0.005 0.003 0.014
(-0.528) (0.666) (1.198) (-0.728) (0.200) (0.709)
# OF TRADES - E. FUTURES 0.009 -0.021 0.070 0.009 -0.019 0.045
(0.702) (-1.291) (3.470)*** (0.630) (-2.132)** (2.129)**
# OF TRADES - CASH 0.038 0.001 0.027 0.047 0.027 0.007 0.054 0.009
(3.577)*** (0.092) (1.747)* (0.713) (2.259)** (1.030) (3.372)*** (0.318)
PIT/E. FUTURES TRADE RATIO 0.386 -0.106 0.143 0.090
(2.581)** (-0.746) (1.742)* (0.639)
FUTURES/CASH TRADE RATIO -0.137 -0.060 0.860 0.315 -0.073 0.060 1.116 0.203
(-1.389) (-0.384) (4.414)*** (0.620) (-0.669) (0.695) (5.759)*** (0.928)
PIT FUTURES VOLATILITY -0.043 0.029 -0.020 -0.018 0.024 0.013
(-3.795)*** (2.075)** (-0.631) (-2.896)*** (1.588) (0.929)
E. FUTURES VOLATILITY -0.032 0.003 -0.005 -0.019 0.009 -0.001
(-2.072)** (0.261) (-0.290) (-1.139) (1.215) (-0.078)
CASH VOLATILITY 0.052 0.015 0.014 -0.027 0.025 0.005 -0.011 -0.024
(3.050)*** (1.431) (1.067) (-0.776) (1.320) (0.834) (-0.772) (-1.608)
PIT/E. FUTURES VOLATILITY RATIO -0.266 0.022 -0.154 -0.061
(-2.546)** (0.161) (-2.685)*** (-0.446)
FUTURES/CASH VOL. RATIO -0.628 -0.141 -0.346 -0.052 -0.463 -0.005 -0.282 0.031
(-7.708)*** (-1.522) (-2.838)*** (-0.248) (-5.153)*** (-0.101) (-2.327)** (0.343)
RSQ 0.154 0.197 0.097 0.033 0.219 0.084 -0.006 -0.007 0.060 0.102 0.054 0.033 0.092 0.042 -0.007 -0.007
#obs 384 384 873 873 873 873 291 291 384 384 873 873 873 873 291 291
The spread, trade, and volatility explanatory variables have been standardized by their standard deviation. t-ratios are in brackets on the second row of each entry.
First Days dummy is for first 3 days for each contract in the Canadian models. Contract #11-19 is one for these contracts and zero otherwise
Gonzalo-Granger
Table 10: Regression Results using Futures Market Daily Information Shares: First Differences
Hasbrouck Midpoint44 
Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck Shares
Gonzalo-Granger Shares
Figure 1: Canadian Futures Market (CGB) Price Discovery Share
Figure 2: Canadian Futures Market (CGB) Price Discovery Share
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Figure 3: U.S. Futures Market Price Discovery 
Information Shares using GovPx data
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Figure 4: U.S. Futures Market Price Discovery Shares
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